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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

Per our telecon, attached is package that went to the President and McFarlane at the last minute on the 23rd. For your files.

STAT

3 January 1984

Done

C/ER. DDCI should be made aware of this.

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Date

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

ER 83-6275//

Orig - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/IA
1 - ER
1 - EXDIR

23 December 1983

Dear Mr. President,

In line with our telephone conversation, I am sending a little reading for your trip west:

First, is a memo reporting the latest development in the ongoing espionage war. Together with the report I sent to you a few weeks ago, it may say a lot about the Soviet state of mind today. There are other reports indicating a range of reaction from prevailing nervousness to fear and gruding respect for our policies in the Soviet view of the state of our relationship today. Whether this represents a threat or an opportunity is the continuing question.

Second,is an interview I gave USA Today about how I see the state of American intelligence today. The spirit and morale is good and we all feel pretty good about our progress over the last three years. I'll have more on that for you right after the first of the year.

Third, is a comparison of the National Estimates in the four Carter years and our three years. I view the National Estimates as the bottom line in the national intelligence process and believe that we have scrupulously covered every corner I can see of US policy concerns. The net is that in our three years we have completed three times as many National Estimates as the previous Administration did for four years and have dealt with the issues in a much deeper and more policy relevant and action oriented way. These Estimates are designed to focus and direct future intelligence collection efforts, something which has never been done before. You will see that the previous Administration never did do a National Estimate on such critical issues of the period or Iran, Afghanistan and Central America, as well as the then ongoing Soviet missile defense program while we totally neglected that aspect of our security. I think you would be interested in just running your eye over the issues that have been dealt with in our program of National Estimates. The process we have developed for putting critical issues under an Intelligence Community and not just a CIA microscope has done wonders in flushing out a range of information and views,making all ten components of the US Intelligence Community feel that they are part of the process and getting full cooperation of all components on the full range of intelligence operations in a way which has not been seen in some time.

Fourth, a copy of my Westminster speech is enclosed. I draw your attention to the historical postscript on page 9. Churchill's reaction to Truman's telling him, as they rode to Fulton on the train together, that he was sending the MISSOURI to Turkish and Grecian waters to send a message to the Soviets to ease the pressure on Iran and Turkey offers an interesting parallel to your recent actions.

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Yours

Bill Casey

Attachments:
As stated

SECRET

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